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ABSTRACT

This paper serves as a review of emission trading systems as a means to achieve
reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants around the
world. The review begins with the history of emission trading, beginning with early
theoretical frameworks developed by economists in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by
early implementations of permit markets similar to modern day emission trading systems.
International negotiations related to emission reductions such as the Kyoto Protocol and
Paris Agreement are discussed. Next, the economic mechanisms of emission trading
systems are discussed, including a brief comparison to carbon taxes as an alternative
market based implement to enact emission reductions. Finally, primary failures of
emission trading systems are presented, showcasing some of the downfalls of such
systems. The conclusion of this paper is that while emission trading systems provide a
means to achieve a specified level of emission reductions at minimal cost, their
dependence on the target level of reductions defines their effectiveness at reducing
emissions. While not guaranteed to effectively reduce emissions, emission trading
systems remain a powerful administrative tool to reduce the burden of cost when faced
with meeting emission targets.
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INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic climate change, often referred to as global warming, is one of the
greatest risks humans have faced in recent history. It refers to human-caused changes in
weather patterns and global average temperature, which affect the entire biosphere of the
planet. Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish scientist, was the first to estimate the effect that
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) has on the temperature of the planet. In his 1896
publication “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the
Ground,” Arrhenius quantified the effect CO2 has on the warming of Earth’s climate
caused by the greenhouse effect. He developed what is known as Arrhenius’s rule, which
states the following: the change in the rate of heating of Earth’s surface during a specified
time period is proportional to the natural logarithm of the ratio of the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 at the end of the period and the atmospheric concentration of CO2
𝐶𝑂2𝐸𝑁𝐷

at the beginning of the period. Mathematically, ∆ 𝑇 = αln (𝐶𝑂2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑇 ). Arrhenius’s
colleague, Arvid Högbom, found that CO2 emissions from industrial sources such as the
burning of coal and other fossil fuels was comparable to emissions from natural sources.
This led Arrhenius to conclude that human-caused emissions would eventually lead to
global warming; however, based on the emissions levels of the late 19th century,
Arrhenius thought that the warming would take place over the course of thousands of
years.
Scientists continued studying the effects of CO2 on Earth’s climate, with much
debate surrounding the truth of the findings. As more effort was put towards researching
these effects throughout the 20th century, scientists were finding more evidence
showcasing CO2’s effect on the temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere. Since the end of
1

the 19th century, the major expansion of industrialization has caused an enormous
increase in the amount of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, as seen in Figure 1. This

Figure 1. CO2 emissions per year listed by emission source. Source: Boden, T.A., G.
Marland, and R. J. Andres, 2015. Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2
Emissions. Caron Dioxide Information Analysis Center. Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
U.S. Department of Energy. Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A.
doi:10.3334/CDIAC/00001_V2015

increase in the amount of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses (GHGs) such as methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxides (NOX) has contributed significantly to rising average global
temperatures. Multiple recent studies have shown that 97.1% of publishing climate
scientists have reached a consensus that humans are causing the observed trend of rising
average global temperatures (Cook et. al., 2013). Additional independent studies have
found the consensus to be between 90 percent and 100 percent, showcasing the
robustness of this consensus (Cook et. al., 2016). With climate scientists expressing the
need to reduce GHG emissions, international, national, and subnational regulatory bodies
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have been trying to develop policies to reduce GHG emissions while avoiding major
economic consequences of such reductions.
The need for the creation of such policies has been driven in large part by
anticipated damages to be caused by an increase in the world’s average temperature. The
International Panel on Climate Change, which researches and releases reports regarding
global climate change, has predicted large social and economic damages caused by
anthropogenic climate change. Potential damage includes increases in extreme weather
events such as hurricanes and earthquakes, reductions in food production and food
security, and rising sea levels which threaten to make coastlines around the world
uninhabitable (Hoegh-Guldberg et. al., 2018). Extreme weather events are likely to cause
damage to human infrastructure, leading to massive repair costs and potential loss of
human life. Increases in droughts are likely to lead to famines in less developed nations,
as well as decreased agricultural production potentially leading to global food shortages.
Rising sea levels may cause flooding around many of the world’s coasts, threatening
people’s ability to live in coastal areas. There are likely to be future effects of global
warming that cannot be predicted, due to the complexity of the systems affected by
changes in the Earth’s climate.
While there have been many proposed environmental regulations for reducing
GHG emissions around the world, they typically fall into one of two categories:
command-and-control regulations and market based regulations. The first of these
categories, command and control regulations, refers to the traditional approach of direct
regulation of an activity where legislation is passed stating what is and is not allowed.
The administrative costs of this type of regulation become exceedingly large as more
3

sources and activities need to be accounted for under the legislation, and enforcement
often becomes extremely difficult. An example of market based regulations is cap and
trade programs. This type of regulation sets a cap on the total amount of emissions
allowed to be discharged within a region, and allows agents to trade amongst each other
for the right to pollute in the form of emission allowances. While each system has
different names for different types of emission allowances, some common names are
emission credits or emission reduction units. Almost all emission trading systems have
standardized emission units to refer to one tonne of CO2 equivalent, meaning the amount
of a pollutant that causes the same impact as one tonne of atmospheric CO2. Market
based regulations have been proven to greatly reduce the cost of achieving a desired level
of emissions, however their effectiveness compared to traditional command-and-control
regulations is still debated.
Efforts to reduce global GHG emissions have been increasing since 1992, when a
large group of United Nations member states created the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The goal of the UNFCCC was to create a
framework for international cooperation to combat climate change, and currently consists
of 197 member states. The UNFCCC eventually drafted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, an
international treaty that set legally binding emission reduction targets for signatories. The
Kyoto Protocol, which includes 192 member states of the United Nations, focuses mainly
on developed countries as they were seen as primarily responsible for the high levels of
GHGs that have been emitted in the past century and a half. Countries with an emission
reduction commitment under the Kyoto protocol are referred to as Annex B countries. In
addition to nationally implemented measures to reduce GHG emissions, the Kyoto
4

Protocol provides several market based mechanisms as additional means for member
states to reduce their emissions. These mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter 1.
The purpose of this paper is to review market based regulations as a policy
instrument to affect reductions in the levels of GHG emissions, in particular cap and trade
systems. Other forms of emission reduction regulations are carbon taxes and subsidies for
reductions. While this paper focuses primarily on emissions trading, a brief comparison
with carbon taxes will be discussed. While different implementations of cap and trade
systems around the world vary in their specific metrics, such as the total cap on the
quantity of emissions allowed, the underlying concept of allowing participants to trade
allowances on a free market is present in all systems.
Chapter one of this paper details the history of cap and trade systems and how the
systems have evolved over time. Chapter two explains the economic theory behind cap
and trade systems, while chapter three presents some failures of cap and trade systems.
Concluding remarks are presented in chapter four.

5

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS
Early Theoretical Frameworks
The concept of using cap and trade systems to lower the cost of reducing pollution
was first explored during the 1960s and 1970s by economists such as Coase, Dales, and
Montgomery in their work regarding permit markets. In addition to this early theoretical
work, researchers at the U.S. National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA),
now known as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were
independently working towards showcasing the efficiency of individual emissions control
combinations compared to traditional abatement regulations. These traditional abatement
regulations, often referred to as command and control regulations, involve the direct
regulation of an industry or activity through government legislation. The work done
during this period would go on to become the basis for modern cap and trade systems
seen throughout the world today.
Coase (1960) discusses the economic implications of well-defined ownership
rights on efficient trading outcomes, while Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972) provide
outlines of theoretical cap and trade models. Burton and Sanjour (1970), working for the
NAPCA, used computer simulations to showcase how least-cost emissions control
combinations are more efficient at reducing emissions than direct abatement strategies.
What follows is a summary and discussion of these early contributions to the literature
surrounding emission trading systems.
In his 1960 paper “The Problem of Social Cost,” Coase explores the problem
presented by the presence of externalities on allocative efficiencies. Externalities, which
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are costs or benefits affecting someone who did not choose to incur such costs or
benefits, tend to skew allocative outcomes to be less socially optimal than if those costs
or benefits were internalized in the optimization process. An example in the context of
environmental regulations would be a firm emitting pollutants which cause adverse
health effects on a surrounding neighbourhood. Unless the cost of such health problems
caused by the firm’s emissions are included in the cost of emitting, the firm will tend to
emit more than is socially optimal. Coase’s first theorem shows that if transaction costs
are non-existent, consumers and firms will bargain with each other to obtain a
distribution of resources that is optimally allocated based on a cost-benefit framework
(Coase, 1960). He argues that such an allocation would be more efficient than one
produced through regulatory litigation. An important point Coase brings up in his paper is
that when dealing with the problem of one agent harming another, the problem is in fact
reciprocal in nature; the issue is not how to stop A from harming B, but whether A should
be harmed or B should be harmed, as it is not possible to stop harm caused to one agent
without harming the other in some way.
Coase (1960) provides multiple examples to illustrate the reciprocity of these
problems, including the above example of a firm’s emissions causing harm to the
surrounding region. He argues that from a legal standpoint, the firm has the right to
pollute on its own property; however, neighbouring residents have the right to not be
harmed by the firm’s actions. When deciding whether or not the firm should be harmed to
reduce the harm being caused to the neighbouring residents, Coase says that a costbenefit analysis taking into account all externalities is sufficient. When performing a
cost-benefit analysis, the total cost to society caused by the firm’s emissions should be
7

weighed against the total benefit of the firm emitting as a necessary means of production.
Since we do not live in a world of zero transaction costs, these transaction costs
significantly hamper agents’ ability to bargain towards an efficient outcome. While Coase
argued that litigation and government regulations often create a cost to the market that
could possibly outweigh the benefit, emissions trading systems help to reduce these costs
as well as transaction costs between firms for reducing emissions; this allows participants
to get closer to the ideal allocation achieved with zero transaction costs proposed by
Coase.
In addition to the theorem presented above, Coase presented a second theorem in
which bargaining is costly and information is imperfect. In this case, Coase argued that
property rights are even more significant than in the previous case. Coase argued that
strong liability rules in this case help achieve an optimal distribution of resources, by
requiring the party with the least cost of dealing with the externality to be responsible for
paying its associated costs. Since bargaining in our world is costly, and perfect
information does not exist, this second theorem seems more applicable to many of the
social problems we as a society face, including pollution. Emission trading systems
embody this second theorem by setting legal limits to the amount of pollution permitted
and allowing those with the least cost of reducing emissions to do so in order to achieve
the required level of reductions. This is analogous to the liability rules referred to in the
second theorem, and by creating well defined “rights to pollute” through the
implementation of emission permits, the ability to trade them in a market setting will
theoretically lead to an efficient outcome.

8

In Dales’ 1968 paper “Land, Water, and Ownership” he presents a framework for
a cap and trade system to reduce water pollution in a given region that is virtually
identical to those seen today. Dales begins his paper by detailing how the lack of an
ownership-rental system for water gives way to over-use and the degradation of water
resources, an example of the Tragedy of the Commons as presented by Hardin (1968).
While these problems have been sufficiently controlled for land use by the
implementation of ownership-rent systems, creating a similar system for water proves to
be much more difficult. Historically, property rights over water have never been
established, thus no rents for the use of water have been established either. If it is
assumed that there is a direct relationship between the level of rent and the development
of new technologies, then it is expected that zero rents for water have led to zero
improvements in technology used to reduce the degradation of water supplies. As such,
levels of water pollution have increased over time and the quality of water sources has
continued to degrade. Pollution has continued to cause externalities relating to both water
and air resources, both without pricing processes, which Dales believes has caused social
friction and economic waste as a result of the lack of an ownership-rental system (Dales,
1968).
In attempting to describe an ownership-rental system for natural water sources,
Dales (1968) begins by identifying how certain characteristics of water sources provide
special problems for ownership rights. A key component to ownership rights is the
divisibility of the asset one is attempting to create an ownership system for. For
something like land, the smallest asset size that can still have exclusive use enforced is
rather small; however, when it comes to water sources, the smallest asset size is very
9

large in comparison. Dales purports that the only sensible form of ownership in a
democratic society for this type of resource is monopoly ownership by the government,
which is the system that has been implemented in Canada. This implies that it is the
government’s responsibility to decide how the water sources must be used, as well as to
enforce the regulations it puts forth. This problem is, for all intents and purposes,
identical to that faced by regulatory bodies around the world when dealing with air
pollution and GHG emissions. Dales classifies uses of water sources under two
categories: waste disposal and everything else. While there exist different quality
demands among all users excluding those interested in waste disposal, Dales argues that
some of these users would be benefitted, and none harmed, by an improvement in water
quality. On the other hand, waste disposers would be harmed by an improvement in water
quality as that implies a reduction in the amount of waste disposed of in the water. This
cost-benefit dichotomy of an improvement in water quality leads to a reduction of the
many uses of water to only the two described above. The government must then decide
how best to divide the water supply between these two conflicting uses.
Dales goes on to explain that there is no economic basis to how the government
should decide to divide the water sources between the two uses. He believes that it is
purely a matter of collective decision-making, since the social value of water cannot be
measured. In effect, the division of water sources between uses translates into how much
waste polluters may emit into the water source, which as stated above, must be
economically arbitrary. Once an amount of allowed waste is decided upon, Dales
suggests there are six main avenues of enforcement available to the government-owner.
Suppose the government caps the amount of waste disposal allowed to be emitted per
10

year at X equivalent tonnes of waste, which represents a 10 percent reduction from the
amount of waste currently being discharged. The government-owner can regulate in one
of two ways: (1) a quota can be assigned to each polluter and set so that the sum of the
quotas does not exceed X; or (2) it can implement an across-the-board regulation
stipulating that each emitter must reduce their waste discharge by 10 percent. It can
subsidize in one of two ways: (3) polluters can be subsidized to reduce their wastes,
either individually or (4) on an across the board basis of a certain amount per tonne of
emissions reduced. Finally, it can charge using one of two schemes: (5) an effluent
charge can be levied on polluters, either individually or (6) on an across the board basis
of a certain amount per tonne of emissions (Dales, 1968).
In his paper, Dales immediately rules out the individual procedures, due to the
prohibitive administrative costs, further rejecting these measures due to their inability to
distribute the cost of reducing pollution in an economically optimal way. Additionally, he
rules out an across the board regulation that each emitter must reduce their waste
discharge by 10 percent, since this would result in a non-optimal distribution of the cost
burden. This leaves the across-the-board schemes of subsidization and charging left to be
compared. Both schemes would result in an optimal cost distribution, since each polluter
would reduce its waste up to the point where the marginal cost of reduction equals the
subsidy provided or the charge levied. Both schemes would need a certain amount of
experimentation to determine the level of subsidy or charge necessary to produce the
emission target X, and the levels would need to vary annually to account for industrial
and demographic growth or decline to maintain the emission target. The subsidy scheme
has two disadvantages that the charging scheme does not. The first is that with a subsidy,
11

firms that can reduce their pollution at a cost that is less than the subsidy will gain profits
from reducing their emissions, thereby making a change to the relative prices of goods
unnecessary. This leads to consumers maintaining their current consumption decisions,
whereas higher prices will reduce consumption and with it the amount of pollution
emitted. With the charging scheme, there will be no extra profits generated and there will
be a change in the relative prices of goods, leading to a socially desirable adjustment to
consumption. The second is that the subsidy scheme provides no incentive to reduce the
amount of waste discharge, whereas the charging scheme provides incentives to reduce
the amount of waste discharged as well as to improve the technology of treating waste
before it is discharged (Dales, 1968). Dales concludes that the across-the-board charging
scheme is the optimal way of implementing the government’s emission target.
He continues by describing a market based implementation of a charging scheme
similar to cap and trade programs currently implemented, whereby the government issues
X pollution rights and puts them up for sale, while passing a law that requires emitters to
hold pollution rights equal to their actual amount of emissions. The price of each
pollution allowance would be set by competition between buyers and sellers of these
allowances, allowing it to adjust to industrial and demographic growth or decline. This
price would represent the rental value of water for waste disposal purposes, thereby
creating an ownership-rental system which will theoretically reduce the amount of
pollution emitted and improve the technology used to clean waste before it is discharged.
Dales suggests that not just polluters should be able to buy and sell emission allowances,
but anybody should be able to trade for them. An example given is a clean-water
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advocacy group purchasing emission allowances and not using them to emit any
pollution, reducing the total amount of emissions in the economy.
Dales concludes his paper by making note of deficiencies of an across-the-board
charging scheme such as the market based approach previously described. There are four
arbitrary elements to such a system: the mapping of water regions, the setting of waste
equivalents, the choice of the allowable amount of waste discharge, and the interval of
time during which the number of pollution rights is fixed (Dales, 1968). While a market
based approach to reducing emissions should theoretically lead to an optimal allocation
of reductions, these four elements are likely to reduce the efficiency of the charging
scheme being used. Dales suggests that the savings in administrative costs achieved by
using a market based system outweighs any loss of efficiency created by these arbitrary
elements. Finally, Dales notes that the market for emission allowances is not a “true” or
“natural” market, where price information affects amounts supplied as well as demanded.
In the emissions market, a rise in the price of an emission allowance signals that the
waste disposal use of water is becoming more valuable; however, it does not mean that
the supply of emission allowances should be increased. The proposed market for
emissions allowances is an administrative tool to reduce the levels of emissions, rather
than a “true” market.
Montgomery builds upon Dales’ work on emissions license markets in his 1972
paper “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs.” Montgomery’s
goal for this paper is to provide a solid theoretical foundation to be used in the
implementation of these markets. Montgomery believes that while emissions markets are
unlikely to lead to Pareto optimality, they valuably function as a policy tool to achieve a
13

specified level of environment quality, similar to Dales’ claim that such markets are
merely an administrative tool (Dales, 1968). In his paper, Montgomery discusses two
types of licenses, emission licenses and pollution licenses. Emission licenses directly
provide the right to emit pollutants up to a certain rate, while pollution licenses provide
the right to emit pollutants at a rate that will not increase levels of pollution above a
specified amount. While these two types of licenses are similar, the primary difference is
that emissions licenses cover only the direct emissions from a pollution source, whereas
pollution licenses are required for each area an emitter may pollute, potentially requiring
a polluter to hold more pollution licenses than the amount of emissions they produce.
Consider the following example: there are three regions along a river, and each
region has one firm that emits pollutants which then travel downstream. The total amount
of pollution in a given region is thus the amount of emissions emitted by that region’s
firm plus the emissions from each firm that is upriver. Each firm would need emissions
licenses that cover their individual quantities of emissions, however each firm would
need pollution licenses that cover each region whose pollution level is affected by their
emissions. In our example, the firm that is furthest downriver would need pollution
licenses to cover only the pollution created in its own region, since no other region is
affected by their emissions. The firm in the middle region would need pollution licenses
to cover the pollution caused in its own region as well as the pollution it creates in the
downriver region as well. The firm that is furthest upriver would need pollution licenses
to cover the pollution it creates in all three regions. Montgomery’s primary thesis is that
the market in pollution licenses will be much more widely applicable than the market in
emission licenses. This is due to pollution typically affecting many more areas than the
14

area it is first emitted in. Emission licenses fail to capture the full extent of damages
caused by pollution.
Montgomery notes that the model he has created is only applicable in situations
where the concentration of pollutants is a linear function of emissions. While this result is
not easy to be generalized, Montgomery puts forth that concentrations of nonreactive
atmospheric pollutants are approximately linearly related to their emissions, as long as
average emission rates and average concentrations are used. Examples of nonreactive
atmospheric pollutants include emissions such as sulphur dioxide (SO2) and CO2, thus
Montgomery’s model is relevant to developing an emission license market for these
common pollutants that are of large concern today. Montgomery creates a theoretical
relationship between average emission rates and average concentrations through the use
of a diffusion matrix, which defines the contribution one unit of emission by a single firm
has on the average concentration of pollution at multiple points. This diffusion matrix
represents the results of a meteorological diffusion model formulated by Martin and
Tikvart in their 1968 paper “General Atmospheric Diffusion Model for Estimating the
Effects on Air Quality of One or More Sources.” Martin and Tikvart base their model on
an equation describing the shape of a smoke plume emitting at a constant rate with a wind
of constant direction and speed.
Montgomery’s model solves for an efficient allocation of emissions for a given
diffusion matrix and specified target concentration levels of pollutants throughout an
area. The model finds that if it is assumed that firms minimize their total production costs
and the market for licenses is competitive, then the total cost of achieving a desired
environmental standard will be minimized. This result is one of the reasons why emission
15

trading systems have received as much attention as they have. Montgomery believes that
since emissions from different locations affect other surrounding areas differently, the
market for pollution licenses will be more applicable as a policy instrument than the
market for emission licenses. Additional work on finding policies with the lowest cost of
reducing pollution was performed by Burton and Sanjour.
Early work by Ellison Burton and William Sanjour used computer simulations to
model the emission sources of several U.S. cities in order to compare the cost and
effectiveness of various abatement strategies to reduce pollution in these areas. Their
1970 paper, “A Simulation Approach to Air Pollution Abatement Program Planning,”
compares abatement strategies for the reduction of particulates and sulfur oxides (SOX) in
the Kansas City area. There are four proposed alternatives for particulate and SOX
emission controls: mechanical controls, low-sulfur coal, low-sulfur oil, and natural gas.
In this context mechanical controls are machines that may be installed by a firm that
reduces either particulate or SOX emissions in some way. The authors stipulate that each
individual firm included in their simulation is unique, and differences in physical capital,
size, and income implies significantly different problems of technical and economic
feasibility for each abatement alternative. For example, no mechanical controls were
allowed for small emitters due to prohibitive costs; the only alternative allowed in the
simulation for these firms is to switch to using a lower sulfur-percentage coal. Larger
firms have much more flexibility in emission controls, however limitations still exist. The
simulation allows for multiple emission controls to be used in conjunction with each
other, allowing as many as 50 different possibilities for each emitter to control their
particulate and SOX emissions. The simulation includes 129 different emission sources in
16

the Kansas city area, leading to an astronomical number of combinations of abatement
strategies to exist, but only relatively few are of interest to area-wide abatement.
There are four abatement strategies selected to be compared to the theoretical
least-cost solution in Burton and Sanjour’s (1970) paper, which are: maximum control of
particulates and SOX, maximum control of particulates alone, equi-proportional
reductions of all major sources of particulate to various percentages of uncontrolled
emissions, and the prohibition of fossil fuels with more than two percent sulfur content
by weight. The least-cost solution is the combination of emission controls which achieves
the same levels of particulate and SOX emissions as the strategy it is being compared to
for the lowest cost. This allows for a comparison of the cost of the direct abatement
strategy to that of the least-cost emission control combination, as the effectiveness of the
two strategies is by definition the same. In all cases, a least-cost emission control
combination with an equal measure of effectiveness to the respective abatement strategy
was found to exist, with a cost far lower than that of the abatement strategy compared.
This paper showcases the potential efficiency of individual emission control
combinations compared to traditional economy wide abatement regulations. The results
of these simulations have helped lead to the concept of cap and trade systems as a means
to efficiently find the least-cost combination of emission reductions through a market
based system.
All of the papers discussed above conclude the effectiveness of markets for
emission allowances as an administrative tool for achieving a desired emission reduction
target while minimizing the cost of such reductions. While there are some barriers
towards achieving the most optimal reduction strategy, these early papers have shown
17

through theoretical and empirical approaches how artificial emission markets tend to be
more efficient than traditional command and control abatement strategies. Even though
this work showcases the merits of such market mechanisms, these systems were not
implemented in full for years to come. It was not until growing concern over
anthropogenic climate change in the early 1990’s that complete emission trading systems
were seriously looked at as a means to combat global warming, and it took still more
years for these markets to become a strategy used to reduce emissions around the world.
Early Permit Market Implementations
One of the earliest emission trading programs was implemented as part of the
United States Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA included an offset trading program
established throughout the 1970’s, which although not a complete emission trading
system included many features of emission trading systems. This program was the first
attempt at using market mechanisms in environmental regulation in the United States
(Hahn & Hester, 1989); however, it was not very successful in reducing the amount of
emissions from participating firms. Hahn and Hester examine this system among others
in their 1989 paper “Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice.” When
examining the system, Hahn and Hester distinguish between internal and external
emission trades, which are defined as between sources in the same facility, and between
sources in different facilities, respectively. While external trades are typically carried out
between two different firms, they do not need to be. Hahn and Hester believe this
distinction to be important for gaining insights into the limitations and potential for
trading activities allowed within the program.
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For the purpose of the offset program, the CAA divided firms into three types new, modified, and existing - and also divided regions throughout the United States into
two categories, attainment and nonattainment areas. Attainment areas are those that
already met air quality standards, while non-attainment areas are those that did not. New
firms are those which were built after emissions were first inventoried in the mid-1970’s,
and existing firms are those that existed before this inventory. Modified firms refer to
existing firms that have been modified to lead to significant increases in emissions since
the program was implemented. Both new and modified firms were expected to comply
with more stringent emissions standards than existing firms were. The goal of the system
was to bring non-attainment areas up to the air quality standard, while attainment areas
were to maintain their quality standards. Firms were either mandated or allowed access to
different trading activities depending on their categorization, and whether or not they
were in an attainment or nonattainment region. These divisions are summarized in Table
1.
The program included four distinct activities that firms could engage in, namely
“offsets,” “netting,” “bubbles,” and “banking.” Of these four activities, the first three
involve the trading of emission rights. Here, emission rights refers to the right a firm has
to emit a certain type of pollutant, which is equivalent to an emissions permit authorized
by a regulatory body. If a firm emits fewer emissions than what it has permits (or
emission rights) for, that difference is referred to as an emissions credit. This emissions
credit represents the tradable right to emit. Offsets were instituted as part of the CAA in
1976 to allow for new emission sources in a region. New and modified sources in a given
region would need to purchase emission credits from existing sources in the same region
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in order to offset their new emissions, otherwise they were not allowed to be built. These
sources were not allowed to emit past their given limit, even if they purchased a greater
amount of offsets than their limit. An important note on the trading of offset credits is
that the terms of trade set by the regulations was such that the trading ratio was always
greater than one. That is, for a source to purchase the right to emit a single unit of
emissions from another source, the source that is selling the offset would need to reduce
their emissions by more than one unit. In the end, this increased the transaction cost of
offsets, providing a disincentive for their use relative to the other trading activities
available.

Table 1. Relation of Emission Limits by Source Type and Area Class to Emissions
Trading. Source: Hahn and Hester, 1989
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Netting allows for modified sources to avoid some emission limits on the
modification in question by reducing the emissions from another source within the same
plant, thereby reducing the net emissions from the plant to below an acceptable level. The
definition of netting necessarily implies that it allows for only internal trading. While the
purchase of offsets did not allow the modified source to emit above its maximum
emission level, netting did, making it a much more enticing option for firms with multiple
emission sources. Another benefit to netting was that the terms of trade did not stipulate a
trading ratio greater than one.
Bubbles refer to the concept of placing an imaginary bubble over existing multisource plants, stipulating that the total emissions from the plant be within an acceptable
level. This allows for the levels of emissions controls for different emissions sources
within the plant to be adjusted to reduce overall costs of reducing the total emissions of
the plant. Essentially, emissions credits would be created by some sources within the
bubble and be used by other sources within the same bubble. The program only allowed
existing plants to make use of bubbles. Banking allows sources to keep their emission
credits for future use, and as such is not a form of trading per se, although an argument
could be made that the source is trading its emission credits to its future self.
Ultimately, Hahn and Hester (1989) found that the effects of the four activities
allowed by the program had insignificant effects on environmental quality. While this
result is disappointing, the program did lead to significant aggregate cost savings for
firms to attain the required emission limits. However, these savings were mostly achieved
through internal trading due to the nature of program, and are much smaller than would
have potentially been realized in the presence of increased external trading. The largest
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determinant of program performance was high transaction costs, a large part of which
came from regulatory restrictions on trading and administrative requirements that
extended the time required for trades to be approved. A major regulatory restriction that
impeded the performance of this program in particular was new and modified sources
being barred from meeting or avoiding their stringent emissions control regulations
through external trading. This provided a disincentive for credit trading for these sources,
reducing the overall demand for emission credits. Another source of high transaction
costs which impeded program performance was simply the level of technology available
at the time, in the context of measuring emissions. Since emission sources needed to
provide information about their emission rates and reductions themselves, they had to
bear the cost of measuring these quantities. This was a relatively costly process that
further disincentivized trading. While this CAA program was seen to have disappointing
results in terms of emission reductions, it provided an excellent proof of concept for the
ability of emissions trading to reduce the cost of emission reductions.
In comparison, the Acid Rain Program implemented by the United States EPA
can be thought of as the evolution of the previous offset program and is one of the earliest
examples of a “true” cap and trade program. The EPA states that it is the first national
cap and trade program seen in the United States and it is still in effect at present.
Information on the Acid Rain Program is sourced from the Acid Rain Program section of
the EPA’s website on Clean Air Markets (Environmental Protection Agency, 2018). The
goal of the program was to reduce the amount of SO2 and nitrous oxide (NOX) emissions
from the power sector, two major precursors to acid rain. SO2 emissions were targeted to
be reduced by 10 million tonnes below 1980 levels, and NOX emissions were targeted to
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be reduced by 2 million tonnes below 1980 levels. The companies regulated under this
program are fossil fuel-fired power plants for SO2 regulations and coal-fired utility
boilers for the NOX regulations. While both SO2 reductions and NOX reductions had
flexibility in the method of emissions reductions, SO2 reductions were the only part of the
Acid Rain Program to utilize a cap and trade system. Unlike the offset program
implemented throughout the 1970’s, the EPA took a much more hands off approach to
reducing emissions with the Acid Rain Program. Companies that fall under the program’s
regulations are required to install emission monitors on sources of pollution, which the
EPA compares to the amount of allowances held by the company. By acting primarily as
a record keeper, administrative costs were lowered substantially from the previous offset
program, which played a large part in the Acid Rain Program’s success.
The Acid Rain Program operates like most other emission trading systems. The
EPA sets a cap on the total level of SO2 allowed within the region the program operates
in for the given time period. The EPA then allocates emission allowances to firms based
on the rate of SO2 emissions and a baseline fuel consumption for each firm. Total
emission allowances cannot exceed the total cap on SO2. In addition to these allowances
allocated by the EPA, firms have the option to buy additional allowances either directly
from other firms or individuals, or from a variety of brokers. Any firm or individual may
purchase or sell emission allowances through the Acid Rain Program, even those not
regulated by the program. This allows for individuals or groups to “retire” emissions
allowances by purchasing them and not utilizing them to emit pollutants, thereby
reducing the overall level of pollution. At the end of each monitoring period, typically
one year, firms regulated by the Acid Rain Program must hold in their accounts an
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amount of emissions allowances equal to the tonnes of SO2 they emitted over the
monitoring period. If a regulated firm does not hold emissions allowances to cover their
level of emissions, the EPA issues an automatic monetary penalty per tonne of emissions
not accounted for with allowances. If firms reduce their emissions levels below their
initial allocations from the EPA, they can then sell their extra emissions allowances on
the market, or bank their extra allowances for future compliance periods.
The Acid Rain Program has been wildly successful at reducing the level of SO2
and NOX emissions throughout the United States. As of 2016, SO2 emissions have been
reduced to 91 percent below their 1980 levels, and NOX emissions have been reduced to
87 percent below their 1990 levels. The success of the Acid Rain Program throughout the
United States provided a concrete showcasing of the power of emissions trading schemes
to reduce emissions levels to a desired target without compromising economic activity.
This success is a likely contributor to the numerous other cap and trade programs that
have been implemented globally since the program’s beginnings. Since the program’s
inception, similar programs have been implemented around the world. These include
international emission trading systems such as the ones implemented by the Kyoto
Protocol and the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, national emission trading
systems such as those in Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, and subnational
emission trading systems such as the Quebec-California emission trading system and the
Tokyo emission trading system.
International Climate Negotiations
International negotiations regarding climate change and global GHG emissions
were spurred by the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
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in 1988. The IPCC was created by the United Nations Environment Program and the
World Meteorological Organization. The goal of the IPCC was to prepare comprehensive
reviews on the global state of knowledge regarding the science of climate change, and to
provide recommendations based on these reviews to leaders around the world. Since its
inception in 1988, the IPCC has released five assessment reports outlining the social and
economic impacts of climate change, and potential strategies to help combat the negative
effects. In addition to the assessment reports, the IPCC has provided numerous
methodology reports and technical papers to various requests for information from the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), world
governments, and international organizations.
The UNFCCC is an international treaty put forward by the United Nations in
response to the first assessment report released in 1990 by the IPCC, which acts as a
framework for international cooperation to combat climate change. The treaty was
opened for signatures in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, and currently has 197 member states included as
signatories. These member states are classified as Annex I or Non-Annex I countries,
where Annex I countries are defined as industrialized nations and economies in
transition. Countries listed by the UNFCCC as Annex I are shown in Table 2 on the
following page.
The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, and by 1995 negotiations had begun
amongst countries to determine how best to combat climate change (UNFCCC, 2019a).
These international negotiations gave rise to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, which
was adopted in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol set legally binding emission limits focusing
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primarily on developed nations due to their historic high levels of industrial activity
(UNFCCC, 2019b). Countries with emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol are defined
within Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). These countries include all
Annex I countries at the time the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, which at the time did
not include Belerus, Cyprus, Malta, or Turkey. The United States did not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, making its target emissions non-legally binding. Currently, the United States is
the only signatory of the Kyoto Protocol that has not ratified the treaty (United Nations,
2005). The Kyoto Protocol has so far defined two commitment periods for emission
reductions. The first commitment period for Annex B countries started in 2008 and ended
in 2012.
Australia

Austria

Belarus

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

European Union

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Monaco

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russian Federation

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

Ukraine

United Kingdom

United States of America
Table 2. List of Annex I countries as defined by the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2019c).

26

The target level of emissions among Annex B countries ranged from 8 percent
below base year levels, to 10 percent above base year levels. The base year level is the
level of a country’s emissions from a previous time period that is used as a reference
quantity. For most countries, the base year is 1990, however some countries, considered
economies in transition, use base years in the late 1980’s (UNFCCC, 2019d). These
countries include many of the former Soviet states. While the Kyoto Protocol expects
countries to enact national measures to reduce their level of emissions, it also provides
several international mechanisms to Annex B countries to achieve their reduction targets.
There are three such mechanisms: international emissions trading, the clean development
mechanism, and joint implementation.
International emissions trading is a cap and trade system among Annex B
countries where each country’s emission cap is their reduction target under the Kyoto
Protocol. An Annex B country that reduces its level of emissions below its target
commitment is able to sell its excess allowances to another Annex B country. This
incentivizes countries that are able to more cheaply reduce their emissions to reduce
further in order to earn money selling the extra emission units. It also provides flexibility
to Annex B countries with higher reduction costs by allowing them to purchase
allowances at a lower cost than their autarkic cost to reduce.
The clean development mechanism is a way for Annex B countries to earn
additional emission allowances through the implementation of emission reduction
programs in developing countries. The Annex B country which implements the project
earns certified emission reduction credits from the UNFCCC which are the equivalent to
one tonne of CO2 and are able to be traded like other emission allowances on the
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international carbon market. The clean development mechanism provides an incentive for
richer countries to invest in green technologies in countries that may not be able to afford
them. The joint implementation program is similar to the clean development mechanism.
Instead of an Annex B country implementing an emission reduction project in a
developing country, they receive an emission reduction unit for implementing an
emission reduction project in another Annex B country. This allows for additional
flexibility for the implementing party to meet its reduction targets, while the country
hosting the project benefits from foreign investment and technology transfer.
When looked at in isolation, the Kyoto Protocol seems to be a success, with two
thirds of Annex B countries meeting or exceeding their reduction targets under the treaty
while half of the remaining third have only missed their target by a moderate margin.
However, there are several countries which have greatly missed their reduction targets,
with New Zealand, Canada, and Austria being the worst offenders (Clark, 2012).
Canada’s failure to achieve emission reductions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol
led to its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011. The reason given by Environment
Minister Peter Kent was that the fines for failing to achieve the reduction targets would
be too great of an economic impact on Canada (CBC News, 2011). While Annex B
countries have reduced their emissions significantly, these reductions have been vastly
overshadowed by rising emissions from other countries in the world not bound by the
Kyoto Protocol. As such, the level of GHG emissions throughout the world has increased
by a large amount, and continues to rise. Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol has so far failed
to reduce GHG emissions to a level able to combat climate change.
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While looking deeper into the emission levels of developing countries such as
China - which do not have reduction commitments through treaties such as the Kyoto
Protocol - a large flaw of the Kyoto Protocol is revealed. Many of these emissions
throughout the developing world are caused by the production of goods that are then
exported to many of the developed countries that have been reducing their emission
levels. Since the Kyoto Protocol assigns emissions to the country from which they
originate, a huge portion of the carbon footprint of Annex B countries is not accounted
for under the Kyoto Protocol. While it may be that emissions have been reduced by these
countries, their carbon footprints have continued to grow as they “outsource” their
emissions to countries not bound by international regulations (Clark, 2011). Global CO2
emissions caused by the production of exported products have almost doubled from 1990
to 2008, and it has been found that international trade has relocated 16 gigatonnes of CO2
from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries from between 1990 and 2008, and the
rate of net emission transfers between Annex B and Non-Annex B countries has been
increasing (Peters et. al., 2011). This failure of the Kyoto Protocol to account for the
“outsourcing” of emissions from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries must be
remedied in future treaties if they are to be effective at reducing global emission levels of
GHGs.
The most recent United Nations treaty focusing on combating climate change, the
Paris Agreement, seems to attempt to fix some of the fundamental issues of the Kyoto
Protocol. The Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016 and as of April 2019
has been ratified by 185 countries (UNFCCC, 2019e). The central aim of the Paris
Agreement is to limit global average temperature increases to be well below two degrees
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Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase
to be below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The key difference between
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement is the level of emission reduction targets. In
the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B countries who ratified the treaty were legally required to
reduce emissions to a target set forth by the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, the Paris
Agreement allows for countries to volunteer their own reduction targets, and offers no
enforcement mechanisms to hold countries accountable should they fail to meet their
targets (Reguly, 2019).
While the Paris Agreement is a step forward in some respects such as by
including a way for developing countries such as China and India to set emission
reduction targets, there is still much doubt as to whether nationally proposed reduction
targets will be enough to keep rising temperatures below the treaty’s goal. The UNFCCC
has expressed serious concern about the carbon-reduction pledges’ ability to reduce
temperature increases to a safe level (Reguly, 2019). Concern over the lack of
enforcement mechanisms is especially valid, as a “name and shame” system is likely to
have little effect on rational decision making from the standpoint of profit maximization.
This lack of enforcement may well be the downfall of the Paris Agreement, and may
subvert its effectiveness before even given a chance at success. This, coupled with
voluntary reduction targets, leaves much doubt as to whether this agreement will come
close to its stated goals. The adoption of new technologies that reduce the amount of
emissions needed in the production of goods, or a decrease in economic growth leading
to less production, are required to combat rising temperatures around the globe. In light
of these drastic changes, the supposed goodwill of participating governments does not
30

instill confidence that these decisions necessary to avert environmental disaster will be
made.
The Paris Agreement includes carbon mitigation frameworks similar to those in
the Kyoto Protocol, such as international emission trading and the so-called Sustainable
Development Mechanism, which is intended to be a successor to the Clean Development
Mechanism. While details of the Sustainable Development Mechanism are yet to be
determined, one major difference between it and the Clean Development Mechanism is
that countries other than Annex B countries are allowed to participate, making the
program much wider in scope. There are no specific commitment periods under the Paris
Agreement, however the implementation of the agreement by member countries will be
evaluated and a new reduction commitment made every five years. The first such
evaluation will be in 2023. Time will tell how effective the Paris Agreement will be at
reducing global GHG emissions, or if inherent issues with the treaty will cause it to be a
failure similar to the Kyoto Protocol.
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMICS OF EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS
A problem faced by regulators designing an emission reduction policy is the
difference in abatement costs between emission sources. Regulations that require across
the board reductions in emission levels for differing sources cost more for sources with
higher abatement costs. This is especially true for international emission reduction
commitments such as those required by the Kyoto Protocol or Paris Agreement, where
countries may have very different marginal abatement costs (MACs) depending on
various factors. Emission trading systems are a means of utilizing differing MACs to
achieve a reduction target at the least total cost to sources involved. The primary idea
behind emission trading systems is that sources with a lower MAC can reduce more than
is required by a specified emissions cap, while selling the excess pollution rights to
sources with a higher MAC.
Marginal abatement cost refers to the dollar amount required for a given source to
reduce emissions by one additional unit of CO2 equivalent. Marginal abatement cost is
typically represented through the use of a marginal abatement cost curve (MACC.) There
are two primary forms of MACCs, continuous MACCs and measure-explicit MACCs.
Continuous MACCs are depicted as a continuous line representing a single dollar value
for a single quantity of emission units reduced. Measure-explicit MACCs represent the
costs and quantities of emissions abated by multiple specific abatement policies and
procedures (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2013). While continuous MACCs are useful for
mathematical modeling and calculating marginal, average, and total cost they do not
accurately describe situations faced by policy makers when developing an abatement
strategy. Regulators are faced with having to choose between specific policies and
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procedures, each with their own total costs and levels of emission reductions. For this
decision making process, measure-explicit MACCs more accurately depict the cost
structure being decided upon. It is possible to use computable models to find least-cost
combinations of such policies in order to generate a continuous MAC from the possible
abatement policies. By generating a continuous MAC from policies depicted by a
measure-explicit MAC and estimating a corresponding mathematical function, the
resulting curve can be utilized in analytic models.

Figure 3. A measure-explicit MACC exhibiting N abatement options ranked from the
least to the most expensive. Each option i is characterized by their abatement potential Ai
and their marginal abatement cost ci. These curves are for a given date T. Source: VogtSchilb and Hallegatte, 2013.

To illustrate the gains from trade between two emission sources made possible by
an emissions trading system, consider the following simplified example illustrated by
Figure 4. There are two countries, Sweden and Germany, such that the slope of Sweden’s
MAC curve is steeper than the slope of Germany’s MAC curve. This is implies that for
reduction levels sufficiently large, the Sweden’s MAC is greater than Germany’s MAC,
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or 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆 > 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐺 . For the sake of this example, we will assume the MAC curves are
linear, implying that marginal abatement cost increases at a fixed rate. Each country faces
an emissions cap, and thus must reduce emissions by an amount 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 , which need not be
the same for both countries. Either may choose to reduce their emissions by the required
amount, or choose to buy or sell emission permits through the emission trading system.
The prevailing price of permits in the emission trading system is 𝑃. The point where the
price 𝑃 intersects the MAC curve is denoted by 𝑅 ∗ and represents the point where the
marginal cost of abating a single unit of emissions is equal to the price of one emissions
unit permit.

Figure 4. “The Emissions Trading Economics of Two Participating Countries” by
“Foxscully xf” at English Wikipedia is licensed by CC BY 3.0.

In this example, 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 for Germany is lower than 𝑅 ∗ , and for Sweden 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 is
higher than 𝑅 ∗ . Germany stands to make a profit by reducing additional units of
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emissions 𝑅 ∗ − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 and selling these additional units at price 𝑃, represented by the
green shaded region ∆123. Meanwhile, Sweden stands to benefit from a reduction in the
cost of emission abatement by buying a quantity of permits equal to 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 − 𝑅 ∗ at price
𝑃. The total reduction in cost is represented by the green shaded region ∆𝑑𝑒𝑓. The total
benefit to the economy is the sum of these two regions, consisting of increased profits for
Germany and reduced costs to Sweden. This example can be generalized to individual
sources within an economy as opposed to entire countries, or to a number of participants
in an emission market greater than two. Those with abatement costs greater than the
prevailing market price of permits will benefit from trading through a reduction in cost,
while sources with abatement costs lower than the market price stand to profit from the
sale of additional abatement permits. It is worth noting here that the gains from trade for
Sweden are larger than those for Germany in this example. The size of each participant’s
gains from trade depends on the slopes of the MAC curves of the participants. A steeper
slope for a MAC curve will lead to a large potential gain from trading.
An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol
Ellerman and Decaux perform an analysis of emissions trading under the Kyoto
Protocol in their 1998 paper “Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using
Marginal Abatement Curves.” Their analysis is based upon MAC curves for different
regions around the globe generated by MIT’s Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
(EPPA) model. These MAC curves may be used to determine marginal, average, and
total costs of specified levels of emission reductions, as well as to quantify the gains from
trade realized by permit trading. The EPPA is a multi-regional, multi-sectoral
Computable General Equilibrium model developed by Yang et. al. (1996) for the MIT
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Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Ellerman and Decaux use
version 2.6 of this model published in 1996 for generating the MAC curves used in their
analysis. The most recent publication of this model is version 6 published in 2015 by
Chen et. al. (2015), which continues to be broadly applied on energy and climate policy
analyses.
The EPPA model produces a shadow price for a specified constraint on emissions
for a given region and time, such as a 10 percent reduction below a reference year for the
United States in 2010. This shadow price is the implicit cost of the defined constraint
within the model when solved for general equilibrium, and represents the social
opportunity cost of meeting the constraint, in contrast to a price found within a real-world
market. By running the EPPA model under different constraints for the same region and
time period, the corresponding shadow prices produced by the model can be plotted to
estimate a marginal abatement cost curve for the given region and time period. It is worth
noting that this paper uses calculations from 1998, using predictions for emissions in
2010 based on data from this period. As such, while the qualitative results are likely to
still be applicable, the quantitative results are likely to not match current data, and should
be viewed with this in mind.
In order to test the robustness of the MAC curves generated by the EPPA,
Ellerman and Decaux (1998) generated MAC curves under various policies and
compared the curves to determine if any significant differences exist. The first such
policy used to generate MAC curves is a proportional reduction (1%, 5%, 10%, 15%,
20%, 30%, and 40% of reference levels) of emissions by all OECD countries. Next, they
compare the MAC curves corresponding to various levels of abatement under no
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emissions trading and fully efficient emissions trading. The result is less than a 10
percent variation in price for a given level of abatement, showcasing the robustness of the
MAC in regard to these different policies. Similar comparisons are made for Annex B
trading and global trading. Additionally, the authors examine one region’s MAC curve
when all other region’s reductions vary by as much as a 60 percent reduction from
reference levels. In all cases, the difference between MAC curves is negligible, indicating
that abatement costs in one country are largely independent of the level of abatement in
other countries.
The significance of the robustness of MAC curves is that each region at a specific
time has a unique MAC curve associated with it. Estimating a well-fitting mathematical
expression for such a curve greatly simplifies the analysis of emissions trading among
regions. Unfortunately, such a simplification causes a potential loss of detail in the
underlying model. These approximated MAC curves do not capture all of the effects of
emissions trading. For the sake of Ellerman and Decaux’s analysis however, they are
sufficient. The importance of estimating these MAC curves is that they are essential to
describing the supply and demand of emission permits. The supply of emission permits is
produced by an emission source abating more than it is required to do so, and the demand
for permits depends on the market price of permits compared to a source’s marginal
abatement cost. Thus, both the supply and demand of permits is determined by the price
of permits and each participants MAC curve. This measure of supply and demand is
summarized by Figure 5.
The vertical axis represents the market price of permits 𝑃 while the horizontal
axis represents the quantity of emissions abated 𝑞. The curve depicted is the marginal
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Figure 5. Willingness to buy or sell permits with regard to a market price of permits.
Source: Ellerman and Decaux, 1998.

abatement cost curve of an emission source, and the vertical dotted line denoted “Kyoto”
is the level of abatement required to meet the source’s Kyoto commitment. In the absence
of emissions trading, the intersection of the Kyoto line and the MAC curve will be the
marginal cost of abating emissions to meet the commitment. This marginal cost without
trading is referred to as the autarkic marginal price. If emissions trading is a possibility,
the emission source will choose to either import (buy) or export (sell) emission permits
depending on the price of permits 𝑃 as shown by Figure 5. In the case of sources that are
not constrained by an abatement commitment, the autarkic marginal price is zero, and
such sources would supply permits to the market at any price greater than zero. The
corresponding market aggregate supply and demand curves can be generated by adding
up the private supply and demand curves belonging to each participant. The intersection
of these two market curves represents the market clearing price and quantity of emission
permits traded (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998).
Ellerman and Decaux structure their analysis of the cost of Kyoto commitments
by beginning with the simple case of OECD countries only, then expanding the market to
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include all Annex B countries, and finally opening the market to include full global
trading. Ellerman and Decaux divide the OECD into four distinct regions: the United

Figure 6. Carbon Emission Reductions with an Emission Trading System between
OECD Countries. Source: Ellerman and Decaux, 1998.

States (USA), Japan (JPN), the European Union (EEC), and all other OECD countries
(OOE). The MAC curves of these four regions, their Kyoto commitment quantities, and
the price of permits that generates a reduction of emissions equal to the total commitment
quantities are shown in Figure 6. The price is this model is found to be equal to
$240/tonne, which seems to be much higher than is expected in a permit market, although
an OECD only permit market does not exist to check the prices.
The diamond on each MAC curve represents the quantity of emission reductions
required by the Kyoto commitments of each region, the horizontal line represents the
market clearing price of emission permits, and the square on each curve represents the
actual amount of emission reductions undertaken by each country. The crosshatched
areas under the curves represent the gains from emissions trading; areas above the price
line represent cost savings and areas below the price line represent profits from permit
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sales. The quantity of permits purchased or sold is represented by the arrows beneath the
x-axis. In this example, Japan and the European Union are importers of permits to the
amount of 86 million tonnes of carbon, while the Unites States and the rest of the OECD
countries take on additional abatement efforts to export the same number of permits. The
total savings for OECD countries from utilizing emissions trading is equal to $13 billion.
Japan sees the largest benefit from trade equal to $10 billion, the Unites States sees the
second largest benefit equal to $2 billion, and the rest of the OECD countries benefit a
portion of the remaining $1 billion.
Ellerman and Decaux (1998) then repeat this process after adding the two regions
Eastern Europe (EET) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). A major difference regarding
the FSU is that the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol do not constrain the
region’s carbon emissions, since the Kyoto commitment it made corresponds to an
emission level higher than the one predicted for 2010. This implies that compliance with
the Kyoto commitment would cost nothing for the FSU, and any reductions made by the
region would go towards supplying emission permits to the market. The FSU is also able
to sell a quantity of permits equal to the difference between their commitment level and
their actual emission levels. The authors refer to this difference as “Hot Air.” While many
observers argue that the export of such permits should not be allowed since they do not
correspond to any actual reduction in emissions, the authors point out that the
commitment level made under the Kyoto Protocol represents a permissible level of
emissions. As such, Ellerman and Decaux argue that the FSU should be allowed to bank
or export these permits should they remain unused.
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The result of adding the two remaining regions of Annex B countries, Eastern
Europe and the FSU, is a reduction in the market clearing price of emission permits. With
only OECD countries included in the analysis the price per tonne of CO2 was $240. The
price per tonne drops to only $127 once the EET and FSU regions are added to the
analysis. While this is a significant drop in price, it is still much higher than is expected
from a permit market implemented in the real world. Since this price is lower than the
autarkic marginal abatement cost of all OECD countries, they all become importers of
permits; the EET and FSU are permit exporters. The total gains from trade among all
constrained Annex B countries is $32 billion, and the FSU receives gains from trade
equal to $34 billion: $14 billion from selling the unused Kyoto entitlement (hot air) and
$20 billion from selling permits obtained from voluntary abatement.
The total gains from trade for all Annex B countries is therefore $66 billion,
bringing the cost of meeting the Kyoto commitments down to $54 billion. The total cost
of achieving these commitments without trade is $120 billion, more than double the cost
when emissions trading is allowed. It is possible to model trading among Annex B
countries without allowing the export of hot air permits, which has the effect of a higher
market clearing price ($150/tonne) and a reduction in the gains from trade of
approximately $16 billion. Nevertheless, the reduction in total cost of meeting the Kyoto
commitments is still significant without the export of “Hot Air.”
To illustrate full global trading, Ellerman and Decaux utilize supply and demand
curves for permits generated from the potential quantities that are bought and sold among
various regions at different prices. There are two supply curves generated for comparison,
one for trading among Annex B countries, and one for global trading. There is only one
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demand curve, since the constrained countries who wish to purchase permits are the same
in both trading situations. A graph of these supply and demand curves is provided in
Figure 7.

Figure 7. Supply and Demand Curves for Emission Permits with Annex B and Global
Trading. Source: Ellerman and Decaux, 1998.

The market clearing permit price of $127 per tonne is shown by the intersection of
the Annex B Trading supply curve and the demand curve. When global trading is
allowed, the market clearing price is far lower, only $24 per tonne. This price seems to be
a much more reasonable estimate for a market price of permits. At this price, all Annex
B countries aside from the FSU are importers of permits. In the aggregate, 71 percent of
constrained countries’ commitments are met by importing permits. Three countries
account for 81 percent of the supply of permits in the world: China (47%), FSU (23%),
and India (11%). With this lower price of emissions, the total cost of meeting the Kyoto
commitments is extremely low, only $11 billion compared to $54 billion with Annex B
trading and $120 billion with no trading (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998).
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If other countries around the world had been subject to emission reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, there would be shifts in the supply and demand
curves depending on the level of commitments. These commitments would come with an
associated cost of abatement and thus an increase in the demand for permits at prices
lower than each country’s marginal abatement cost. Thus for low price levels, the
demand curve would be expected to shift to the right. It is unclear as to whether this
would result in a different market clearing price of emission permits. If the marginal
abatement cost of non-Annex B countries is lower than the market clearing price
indicated above with global trading, there would be no change in price. However, if the
marginal abatement cost of one or more countries is above this price, the demand curve
would shift to the right and the market clearing price would increase. The price increase
would be larger as more countries exist with marginal abatement costs above the
unconstrained price level above ($24 per tonne).
While these results qualitatively make sense from the viewpoint of economic
theory, quantitatively they vastly overstate the price of Certified Emission Reduction
(CER) permits, which are the main tradable permit under the Kyoto Protocol. According
to market data from the Intercontinental Exchange, an electronic market for trading
energy commodities, the price of one CER permit costs €0.24/tonne, one hundred times
less than the full global trading case. This seems to be more than just error from predicted
data, and seems to point to larger problems between the theoretical model and what has
happened in the world since. It is possible that the model itself is incorrect, vastly
overstating the implicit costs of reducing emissions. Another possibility however is that
Kyoto Protocol reduction targets were not met or enforced properly, or that emissions
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have grown faster than expected, increasing the supply of permits and driving the price
down. Indeed, this price seems excessively low, especially compared to the price of an
emissions permit from the European Union Emission Trading System, which is listed on
the Intercontinental Exchange at €26.60/tonne. This is almost the same as the price
predicted for full global trading of emission permits, but far below the price determined
in the Annex B trading scenario. The price of an emissions permit in the QuebecCalifornia emission trading system lie between these two prices, fluctuating around
$16/tonne depending on the auction they are purchased from.
The implications of an emissions trading scheme that allows for gains from trade
among sources is a greater ability for a region to meet reduction requirements imposed
upon it by regulators. Compared to a region without trade, the cost savings afforded to
high-MAC emission sources may allow them to meet their abatement requirements when
they are not able to afford to do so in the absence of trade. This has the potential to
provide a region with a measure of economic stability, under the assumption that not
complying with abatement regulations can lead to the closure of a firm or heavy
monetary penalties. The other gains afforded by emissions trading are the increased
profits achieved by low-MAC sources. While the level of reductions is the same under
both autarkic and trading scenarios, these profits can be reinvested by firms to achieve
further reductions or increased productivity within a region. While current emission
trading systems are a step in the right direction to place a price on carbon and help curb
usage, it seems that the price is not indicative of the true cost of emissions, when
considering potential damages caused by increases in global average temperature. Due to
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the way emission trading systems work, it is likely that these prices show that the
allowable quantity of emissions are far lower than what is required to avert disaster.
Permit Allocation
There are three primary distribution channels that regulators can use to initially
allocate permits to individuals and firms within an economy. Once the initial round of
permits has been allocated, market participants are able to trade the permits among one
another through market channels similar to other commodities. The first method to
allocate permits is for regulators to sell them, either with a fixed price or through an
auction mechanism. The benefit to an auction over a fixed price sale is that prices are
flexible, and thus an efficient market clearing price is more easily found. Regulators
setting a fixed price incurs administrative costs to determine the market clearing price,
reducing the efficiency of the emission trading system. By utilizing an auction
mechanism, firms bid for permits based on their demand and the available supply of
permits. Firms with a higher level of emissions would have a higher demand for permits
and would thus be willing to pay more, whereas firms with low levels of emissions would
bid less due to a smaller number of permits demanded. Regulators are able to have some
control over auction prices by setting a reserve bid price, essentially placing a price floor
on permits and guaranteeing a minimum cost. In conjunction with permit supply controls,
regulators are able to entice firms and individuals to reduce their emission levels by
making permits more expensive or more scarce.
The second option for regulators is to simply give the initial allocation of permits
away to firms and individuals for free. This would reduce the total cost of emitting, and
would potentially increase profits from the sale of unneeded permits on the secondary
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market after the initial allocation. By not having to incur extra costs to cover emissions,
firms that compete in highly competitive international industries are able to keep their
current competitive position. A concern of charging such firms for emissions is that by
increasing their cost of production, they will no longer be able to compete with rival
firms in regions that do not have emission regulations. This could have widespread
negative effects on some economies where the primary employers are firms such as these.
The increase in costs could cause these firms to move to a less regulated region, or to
have to shut down entirely if they are unable to raise prices sufficiently to cover the
increase in cost. There is a downside to giving permits to firms for free. By doing so,
there is no incentive for firms to change their emission decisions from past behaviour,
since they will expect to receive permits covering their emissions for free. While this
does limit emission growth when combined with a cap, there is no incentive for firms
who receive free permits to innovate to reduce emission levels beyond what the cap
requires.
The third allocation option available to regulators is offset generating programs.
Offsets are emission allowances generated by individuals or firms through programs
typically organized by regulators of emission trading systems. Offset permits are
generated by either reducing the amount of GHG emissions from a source, such as a
methane capture program on a dairy farm, or by sequestering atmospheric carbon such as
through the creation of forests. Each offset is the equivalent of one tonne of CO2 and is
able to be bought and sold through emission trading markets. Often times emission
trading systems only include a small subset of firms and emission sources under their
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regulations, and offset programs allow for individuals and firms that are not included in
the trading program to participate.
There is no difference between offset permits generated within an emission
trading system and emission permits allocated to sources with commitments. The greatest
advantage of offset programs is that they incentivize individuals with small carbon
impacts to enact reductions by allowing for the sale of such offset permits to earn
additional income. The potential downside is that if large enough firms undertake efforts
to generate offset permits in a large enough quantity, the increased market supply of
permits may provide downward pressure on prices, making all emissions in the economy
cheaper. This has the potential to reduce the incentive to innovate in low-emission
technologies, and allows firms to emit more for the same price they were paying
previously. While regulators can impose restrictions on how many offset permits may be
used towards a specific firm’s emission cap, it becomes increasingly costly to monitor the
distribution of offsets and where they are being used.
All allocation methods have benefits and costs that must be weighed when
deciding how to initially allocate permits in an emission trading system. Regulators will
likely have to balance a combination of these methods to achieve their goal of reduction
in overall emission levels while maintaining a level of economic stability in the region
they operate. An analysis of the firms within a region for a potential emission trading
scheme will be necessary to determine the levels of permits allocated by each method.
While the majority of permits should be sold either with a fixed price or by auction, as
well as through the use of offset programs, it may be necessary to give some firms free
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permits to maintain certain jobs for consumers, or to maintain competitive standing in
international markets.
Comparisons to Carbon Taxes
There exist other market-based reduction schemes that have been implemented in
various regions around the world to incentivize emission reductions aside from emission
trading systems. The most common system of this type is a tax on carbon emissions set
by regulatory bodies. Both a carbon tax and an emissions trading system place a price on
carbon with some overlap of policy design. A cap and trade system that is comprehensive
in scope and has an upstream point of regulation is very similar to a comprehensive,
upstream carbon tax. Comprehensive in scope means that the policy covers all emissions
in a given region, and an upstream point of regulation refers to regulations applied where
the emissions enter the market, typically as part of the production process (Durning et.
Al., 2009). Cap and trade systems and carbon taxes however, work in two fundamentally
different ways. An emissions trading system acts as a quantity instrument, while a carbon
tax acts as a price instrument. What this means is that an emissions trading system sets an
allowable quantity of emissions and lets the market determine the price of emissions,
while a carbon tax sets a price for emissions and lets the market determine the quantity of
emissions produced (Durning et. al., 2009).
There are several other smaller differences between the two systems aside from
the type of instrument they are. Carbon taxes may be simpler to set up and be able to be
administered faster than an emission trading system. If a regulator faces severe time
constraints or administrative restrictions, a carbon tax system may be a better solution
than a cap and trade system. A large advantage of emission trading systems, however, is
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that they are able to be linked together among various regions, either sub-nationally,
nationally, or internationally. Emission trading systems also create resistance to changes
in legislation that may reduce the value of emission permits from permit holders, such as
a loosening of the cap over a given region. While they have their differences, emission
trading systems and carbon taxes can be combined to provide a more stable price of
carbon when permits for a cap are auctioned off. The carbon tax acts as a reserve price in
the auction, maintaining a price floor and ensuring the incentive to reduce emissions does
not weaken too much (Durning et. al., 2009).
When compared in practice, emission trading systems are more feasible at
achieving a given level of reduction. Since the reduction level is defined by the cap
placed on emissions, there is certainty in how much emissions will fall, and does not
require any further knowledge than what level that cap should be. In contrast, emission
taxes as a price instrument require information about what price level will correct the
inefficiencies caused by GHG emissions. Such information is likely not available, and
will be either very costly to obtain, or not possible to obtain at all. Since potential future
damages are unknown, it is very difficult to set a price per unit of emissions to cover
these damages. As more research has been done on the economic damages of climate
change, the potential damage costs have increased over time, indicating that the price set
by a tax is likely to underestimate the future costs of damages. While emission taxes may
be easier to implement, and may provide some benefit, they are likely to be less effective
than emission trading systems due to the additional information required.

49

CHAPTER 3: FAILURES OF EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS
Leakage
One failure of emission trading systems is leakage of emissions. Leakage refers to
emission sources moving from an emission constrained location to one with either less
strict or no regulations whatsoever. This issue arises from unequal policies enacted by
different regions, and greatly undermines the effectiveness of emission trading systems.
Due to the relative mobility of firms enabled by the advances in transportation that have
occurred in the past few decades, it has become more difficult to enact heavy regulations
on firms within a specific region. While tariffs and border taxes help increase the cost of
a firm producing in a different country than its primary market, they are ineffective at
differentiating between products and firms from that country. Leakage of emissions is
very similar to firms moving to developing countries to exploit looser labour regulations
and cheap labour, while exporting the products back to developed countries.
Developed countries, such as Annex B countries with emission level restrictions
under the Kyoto Protocol, have been criticized of “exporting” their emissions to less
developed countries without emission regulations, such as China. Even if production
within a domestic region does not move to another region, if a large percentage of
consumption is on goods imported from a foreign region with no emission regulations,
the increased demand of imports causes as much of an issue as if emissions were
increased in the domestic region. While the issue of leakage and the exportation of
emissions cannot be remedied without full global regulations on emissions, they can be
greatly reduced by regulating key emitters throughout the world. The Paris Agreement,
which allows for all countries to volunteer emission reduction targets, is a good first step
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toward this. Further, expanding the scope of regulations and emission trading systems is
likely to increase efficiency and reduce these issues.
Manipulation of Emission Trading Systems
Similar to many other markets, there is the potential for participants to manipulate
a permit trading system to either increase or decrease permit prices for their benefit. This
concern is especially strong when there are few market participants, in which case
collusion between agents becomes easier to carry out. Manipulation of an emission
trading system would undermine the effectiveness of reducing total emissions, as well as
potentially harming the operations of other agents by unfairly increasing their costs to an
unsustainable level. If emission trading systems are to become widely used as a tool to
reduce emissions, there must be some measures taken to protect against such
manipulations. While measures can be taken to reduce the risk of manipulation, there
does not exist an efficient system that agents are willing to participate in that is unable to
be manipulated (Shin and Suh, 2007). An example of manipulation provided by Shin and
Suh are agents misrepresenting their production technologies, in effect falsely reporting
their actual amount of emissions. While this may be avoided by having emissions
monitored by regulators, as the number of emission sources being monitored increases, so
do the costs of monitoring them. As the monitoring costs increase, the effectiveness of an
emission trading system to reduce the costs of abatement decreases.
Level of the Emission Cap
Another potential source of failure for emission trading schemes comes from the
level that is set for the cap on emissions. Choosing a cap is a complex issue that is more
political in nature than it is economic, and as such there are wide ranging levels among
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emission trading systems implemented around the world. It should be emphasized here
that emission trading systems are merely a way to efficiently achieve a capped emission
level; however, the level of such a cap is economically arbitrary. What this means is that
emission trading systems do not reduce emissions in and of themselves. Instead, they are
a mechanism to achieve a given reduction target at the lowest cost. Since such caps are
set by regulators, political pressure from firms and lobbyists may lead to regulators
setting a cap that does not lead to any meaningful reductions in emissions. Thus, if the
emission cap is insufficient to avert environmental damage, emission trading systems will
be of no use with regard to helping combat climate change.
Additionally, a cap that is set too low can potentially strangle the economy within
the region the cap is implemented. Emission reducing technologies can achieve a certain
amount of reductions, and a cap set below this level would require a reduction in output
in addition to implementing greener technologies. As the cap is set lower and lower,
production will continue to fall to meet it, which would reduce the level of consumption
within the region. The effect may be that consumers pressure regulators to increase
output, or emission leakage as producers move to other less constrained regions. Both of
these pressures work against the need for lower emissions, and as such regulators face a
difficult decision on the level of the emission cap to implement, which defines the ability
of an emission trading system to reduce emissions. It seems to be that climate scientists
should set the required cap on emissions at a level which their models deem sufficient to
reduce the threat of warming average global temperatures, however it is unlikely that this
will happen due to the nature of global political processes.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
Emission trading systems and other market based mechanisms have been
proposed as a means to reduce pollution and to help internalize the externalities present in
the usage of public goods. There is strong theoretical evidence that emission trading
systems can be an effective means of finding a least-cost solution for achieving a level of
emissions proposed by a regulatory body. They achieve this through a reduction in
administrative costs, and by incentivizing those with a lower cost of reducing emissions
to do so and sell their excess reduction capacity to others with a higher cost. In addition
to theory, there is strong empirical evidence that such systems can be successful, so long
as they are well designed with an emission cap that achieves the reductions sought after.
When compared to other market based reduction strategies such as emission taxes,
emission trading systems tend to be more effective due to setting the quantity of
reductions outright and letting the market determine the price, as opposed to setting the
price and allowing the market to determine the quantity reduced. This second method
requires much more information on what price will achieve the desired reductions, and is
more likely to be affected by market imperfections and stochastic shocks. The drawback
of emission trading systems however is that they do not in and of themselves cause a
reduction in emissions, but rather rely on the defined emission cap. Since this cap is set
by regulators, there are non-economic factors that may influence it to be non-optimal, in
which case the system will never achieve the optimal reductions. Even though, emission
trading systems remain a powerful administrative tool that reduce the costs of reductions
necessary to help prevent future environmental damages and disaster.
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